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What Is the Effect of Financial 
Stress on Economic Activity?
By Troy Davig and Craig Hakkio
F
inancial stress recently pushed the U.S. economy into its most 
severe recession since the Great Depression. Despite the apparent 
risk financial stress poses to the real economy, the relationship 
between financial stress and economic activity is complex and not well 
understood. The experience of the United States and other countries 
has shown that businesses and households often pull back on new in-
vestments and purchases in response to the tighter credit conditions 
and greater uncertainty caused by financial stress. But important gaps 
remain in our understanding of this critical relationship. 
One potential complication in understanding the relationship is 
that it may change when financial stress is elevated and the economy 
is in a recession. Over the last 20 years, the U.S. economy has shown 
a tendency to switch between two very distinct states—a normal state 
in which economic activity is high and financial stress is low, and a 
distressed state in which economic activity is low and financial stress is 
high. Does the impact of financial stress on economic activity depend 
on which of these two states currently prevails? And how do changes in 
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financial stress and economic activity affect the likelihood of switching 
from one state to the other?
This article examines these questions. A key finding is that, over the 
last two decades, increases in financial stress have had a much stronger 
effect on the real economy when the economy is in a distressed state. 
In addition, rising financial stress plays a role in eventually tipping a 
strong economy into a distressed state. As a result, policymakers should 
monitor financial conditions closely, both in good as well as bad times. 
The first section explores the theoretical links between financial 
stress and economic activity. The second section examines the empirical 
relationship, taking into account whether the economy and financial 
system are in the normal or distressed states. The third section explores 
the dynamic linkages between financial stress and economic activity 
across the different states. 
I.	 THE	IMPACT	OF	FINANCIAL	STRESS	ON	ECONOMIC	
ACTIVITY:	THEORETICAL	FRAMEWORKS
To gain insight into how financial stress influences real economic 
activity, this section discusses two prominent economic theories. The 
first comes from research on “real options,” which incorporates un-
certainty into the decision of whether to, for example, invest in a new 
manufacturing plant today, or postpone the decision for a while to see 
how the uncertainty is resolved. The second theory shows how an in-
crease in financial stress—that is, a worsening of financial conditions—
affects the real economy by directly tying the cost of borrowing to the 
financial condition of firms. In this setting, a “financial accelerator” 
arises through which a deterioration in the financial condition of firms 
raises their cost of borrowing funds and thus leads to less investment. In 
turn, a decrease in investment will lower profits and further impair the 
financial condition of firms. Both theories, the real option and finan-
cial accelerator, indicate that high financial stress, as reflected primar-
ily through heightened uncertainty, is associated with lower economic 
activity. 
The real option framework
A central element of the real option theory is that it incorporates   
the value of waiting, allowing uncertainty to be resolved, before making ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2010  37
a new, irreversible investment.1 For example, a new manufacturing plant 
may be profitable in the future if the price of its output rises, but it may 
lose money if prices fall. By waiting, the firm has more information about 
its economic prospects and can then make a more informed choice about 
whether to proceed with an investment. Thus, the term real option per-
tains to the option a firm has of waiting to make a real investment. Impor-
tantly, this option has value that firms should consider when undertaking 
a new investment. 
A key result from the real option framework is that when uncer-
tainty rises, waiting to make a new investment is often optimal. Low 
uncertainty generally means there is a small probability of an extreme 
outcome, including one so bad that the investment would prove un-
profitable. As a result, there is not much to be gained from waiting 
for additional information before making the investment. In this case, 
firms are likely to invest today, given the investment is deemed to be 
profitable on average. However, when uncertainty is high—that is, 
when the probability of an extreme outcome is high—the firm will of-
ten find it optimal not to invest today but to wait until the uncertainty 
is resolved. Then, in the future, if the bad outcome appears certain, the 
firm will forego the investment. Alternatively, if it appears certain the 
bad outcome will not to occur, the firm will go ahead with the invest-
ment. In other words, high levels of uncertainty lead to reduced invest-
ment today and, depending on how the uncertainty is resolved, may 
lead to increased investment in the future.2
Focusing  on  the  effect  of  uncertainty,  the  real  option  theory   
suggests that financial stress will lead to less investment spending.3 
This occurs because financial stress often reflects heightened financial   
market volatility and greater uncertainty about the future perfor-
mance of the economy. Thus, firms may interpret a sudden jump in 
financial market volatility as a reflection of more uncertain economic 
conditions in the future and will pull back on new investment. 
The financial accelerator model
When financial stress is low, financial markets operate smoothly. 
Thus, low financial stress can be viewed as “greasing the wheels” of 
economic transactions and facilitating economic growth by efficiently 
transferring funds from savers to borrowers. Savers are willing to extend 38  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
credit to firms in exchange for an expected positive return on their sav-
ings. Risk is always present, but during normal times, savers may per-
ceive they have a firm grasp on the risks they face. In this case, financial 
markets provide a valuable function by efficiently pricing such risks and 
appropriately compensating savers. Funds then flow to borrowers, and 
riskier borrowers pay a higher interest rate, or risk premium, on what 
they borrow.
If financial markets become significantly impaired and financial 
conditions become stressful, however, obtaining funds from savers be-
comes more difficult and costly for firms and consumers. The premium 
that riskier borrowers have to pay increases, and the riskiest borrowers 
may be unable to obtain credit on any terms. If firms or consumers 
are unable to obtain funds to finance investment spending or purchase 
consumer durables, then both types of spending will fall. Such a re-
sponse was particularly evident during the recent financial crisis when 
many financial markets simply stopped operating. 
The workhorse model often used to address the impact of financial 
conditions on the real economy is the financial accelerator framework 
developed by Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). In this setting, 
firms that need to borrow from external sources, or obtain external 
financing, pay a premium to borrow that depends on their financial 
position.4 For example, firms with high debt levels must pay a higher 
interest rate on the funds they borrow to undertake an investment com-
pared to an identical investment by a firm with less debt. This premium 
is referred to as the “external finance premium.” It represents the cost 
difference of financing a new investment by raising funds externally, 
such as by borrowing from a bank, versus using internal funds, such as 
the opportunity cost of using cash on hand. 
The term financial accelerator arises from a feedback mechanism 
in the model. When the economy is booming, firms post higher profits 
and have stronger balance sheets. As a consequence, they appear to be 
less risky, so banks charge them a lower external finance premium. In 
turn, the lower external finance premium induces firms to make more 
new investments, which further contributes to economic growth. This 
mechanism works in good times, when the economy is growing rap-
idly, but also works in reverse, generating an “adverse feedback loop.”5
In this case, weakening economic conditions cause profits to decline ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2010  39
and balance sheets to weaken. In response, banks charge a higher exter-
nal finance premium, which causes firms to invest less. 
If uncertainty increases, banks respond by raising the average exter-
nal finance premium because they expect more firms to go bankrupt.6 
If a firm files for bankruptcy, the bank will have to incur a cost to verify 
that the firm has insufficient assets to repay its loan and claim the firm’s 
remaining assets. In response, banks charge a higher average premium 
on firms that borrow funds as compensation for the higher rate of ex-
pected bankruptcies. Consequently, the higher average external finance 
premium causes the average level of investment to decline. 
In the financial accelerator model, various shocks to the economy 
can cause further fluctuations in the external finance premium and, in 
turn, investment. For example, a sudden shift in investor sentiment 
may cause asset prices to fall for reasons unrelated to economic funda-
mentals, leading to a decrease in the net worth of firms. Such an unex-
pected drop in the net wealth of firms will sharply increase the external 
finance premium and generate what is typically thought of as financial 
stress.7 Chart 1 shows the estimated response of the external financial 
premium and real economic activity to a 5 percent decline in net worth 
based on a particular version of the financial accelerator model. (Ap-
pendix A describes the model and assumptions about parameter val-
ues.) The decline in net worth weakens firms’ balance sheets, so banks 
charge them a higher external finance premium to borrow. In response, 
firms invest less, causing economic activity to fall. Over time, the im-
pact of the shock wears off and the economy recovers.
An important aspect of the financial accelerator model is that the 
strength of the relationship between a firm’s net worth and the premium 
it must pay to borrow depends on the uncertainty of its profitability. 
Under heightened uncertainty, the premium becomes more sensitive to 
a firm’s financial condition.8 During such times, credit spreads become 
more sensitive to changes in the financial conditions of firms, causing 
firms to make larger adjustments to their investment plans. The follow-
ing equation describes a mechanism that links the strength of the firm’s 
balance sheet to the external finance premium:
Change in the external finance premium =
 -v* (Change in the ratio of a firm’s net worth to its capital stock). 40  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
The premium decreases as the ratio of the firm’s net worth to capi-
tal stock rises. Importantly, the strength of the response of the external 
finance premium to such changes, v, depends on the level of uncertain-
ty in the economy. As uncertainty rises, so does the value of v. That is, 
the external finance premium becomes more sensitive to the financial 
condition of firms. For example, the gap between the premium paid by 
a firm with a low ratio of net worth to capital and a firm with a high 
ratio will be greater in a highly uncertain environment than in a more 
tranquil one. 
To illustrate, Chart 2 compares the response of the economy and 
external finance premium to a decline in net worth in the baseline 
scenario, given in Chart 1, to the response in a period of heightened 
uncertainty.9 Under higher uncertainty, the external finance premium 
becomes more sensitive to the net wealth of firms, causing a larger and 
longer-lasting decline in economic activity. 
























































































































Note: Assumes a 5 percent decline in net wealth. Details of the model are in Appendix A.
Source: Authors’ calculations
Chart 1
RESPONSE OF REAL ECONOMY AND EXTERNAL  
FINANCE PREMIUM TO A DECLINE IN THE NET 
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The financial accelerator framework suggests that, when uncertain-
ty is high, the economy becomes more susceptible to financial shocks, 
such as a decline in the net worth of firms. In contrast, when uncer-
tainty is low, the economy is better equipped to contend with financial 
shocks. This comparison will be made again later in the article, when 




The theories discussed in the previous section suggest a strong re-
lationship between financial stress and economic activity. This section 
examines the relationship using an empirical framework and data that 
includes several recent periods of financial stress in the U.S. economy. 
Note: Assumes a 5 percent decline in net wealth. Details of the model are in Appendix A.
Source: Authors’ calculations
Chart 2
RESPONSE OF REAL ECONOMY AND EXTERNAL  
FINANCE PREMIUM TO A DECLINE IN THE NET 
WEALTH OF FIRMS: LOW VS. HIGH UNCERTAINTY
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Measuring financial stress and economic activity
Financial stress is measured using the Kansas City Federal Reserve’s 
Financial  Stress  Index  (KCFSI).  This  monthly  index  combines  11   
variables that provide a range of economic signals of financial stress 
(Hakkio and Keeton). The variables fall into two broad categories: cred-
it and liquidity spreads  and  measures  based on the actual or expected 
behavior of asset prices.10 A key aspect of the KCSFI is that periods of 
financial stress are episodic (Chart 3, top panel). For example, there ap-
pear to be at least three distinct episodes of financial stress, as the index 
was clearly elevated around 1991, 1998-2002, and during the recent 
financial crisis.11
Economic activity is measured using the Chicago Fed National Ac-
tivity Index (CFNAI) (Chart 3, bottom panel). The CFNAI is con-
structed in a similar way to the KCFSI, combining a series of 85 mac-
roeconomic data that provide a broad range of measures of economic 
activity. The CFNAI is more useful than real gross domestic product 
(GDP) as a measure of economic activity in this context because it 
is available monthly, in contrast to the quarterly release of real GDP. 
Other economic indicators, such as nonfarm payrolls, are also available 
monthly but focus on a single aspect of the economy, such as the labor 
market, while the CFNAI incorporates data from several categories of 
macroeconomic data.
Both the KCFSI and CFNAI have a mean of zero and a standard 
deviation of one. Thus, when the KCFSI exceeds zero, financial condi-
tions are more stressed than average. Similarly, when the CFNAI ex-
ceeds zero, the economy is expanding faster than average. 
Simple inspection of Chart 3 reveals two aspects of the relationship 
between financial stress and economic activity that are important when 
choosing and specifying an economic model. First, periods of height-
ened financial stress and weak economic activity are episodic. Financial 
conditions are generally benign for extended periods of time–but can 
suddenly spike. Similarly, economic activity generally grows at or above 
trend for extended periods of time–but can suddenly drop. Second, 
episodes of heightened financial stress and weak economic activity gen-
erally coincide. For example, the 1990-91, 2001, and recent recessions 
are clearly visible in the chart and roughly coincide with heightened 
financial stress. ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2010  43
A regime-switching model
Since periods of elevated financial stress and weak economic activ-
ity are episodic, any empirical model should ideally be able to cap-
ture abrupt changes in these data. One way to capture such changes is 
through a regime-switching model.12 The core elements of the model 
are described in Figure 1, with details given in Appendix B. 
As shown in the figure, the regime-switching model developed for 
this analysis has two regimes, referred to as the normal and distressed 
regimes. For most of the sample, the economy is in the normal regime 
with low financial stress and high economic activity. Occasionally, the 
economy switches to the distressed regime, with high financial stress 
and low economic activity.13
A regime-switching model provides a rich framework in which to 
study how financial stress affects economic activity. In particular, this 
model captures different channels through which financial stress and 
economic activity interact. As Figure 1 shows, the defining character-
Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
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istic of each regime is its average level of financial stress and economic 
activity, as well as its volatility. 
This model also allows the dynamic interaction between financial 
stress and economic activity to vary across the two regimes. The finan-
cial accelerator model from the last section suggests that certain finan-
cial shocks have a larger impact on economic activity when uncertainty 
is high. Thus, the financial accelerator model suggests that financial 
shocks in a distressed regime should have a larger impact on output 
than in a normal one. As explained in detail in the next section, the 
U.S. data confirm this prediction. 
Finally, while the baseline model assumes that the probability of 
moving between the normal and distressed regimes (p and q in Figure 1) 
is constant, this assumption can be relaxed in a regime-shifting model. In 
particular, it is plausible that the probability of moving between regimes 
may itself depend on the level of financial stress and economic activity.
Normal and distressed regimes: Timing and summary statistics
Estimation of the regime-switching model determines the proper-
ties of each regime. Such properties include the average level of each 
variable and volatility, as well as the likelihood of being in one regime 
Figure 1
DIAGRAM OF THE REGIME-SWITCHING MODEL
Normal
•  Low financial stress
•  High economic activity
•  Low volatility
•  Financial stress shocks  
  lead to smaller declines  
  in economic activity.
Distressed
•  High financial stress
•  Weak economic activity
•  High volatility
•  Financial stress shocks  
  lead to larger declines in  
  economic activity.
Switches with probability q
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Chart 4












































































Source: Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City and authors’ calculations.
or the other. Specifically, the model only estimates the probability of 
being in a particular regime, not whether the economy is actually, or 
definitely, in a particular regime. Thus, the two regimes are determined 
solely by the data and are not imposed on the results. 
The shaded area in Chart 4 shows the probability that the economy 
was in the distressed regime at each point in the sample period, from 
1990 to September 2009. When the probability approaches one, the 
regime-switching model indicates that the economy was most likely in 
the distressed regime. The timing of this regime is generally consistent 
with slowdowns in economic activity and spikes in financial stress, as 
shown by the values of the KCFSI and CFNAI superimposed on the 
chart. The first episode of high financial stress occurred around 1991, 
when the U.S. banking system was suffering an array of difficulties due 
to real estate losses and the overall economy was in recession. The second 
episode occurred at the time of the Russian bond default and the ensu-
ing problems in the financial sector. The third episode occurred amid the 
dot-com bubble collapse, the 2001 recession, and the September 11 ter-46  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
rorist attacks. The fourth episode occurred amid the accounting scandals 
and sluggish recovery following the 2001 recession. The final episode 
reflects the recent recession and financial crisis of 2007-09. 
Thus, the timing of the distressed regime is generally consistent 
with negative economic and financial events over the past 20 years. 
Overall, the regime-switching model indicates that the economy was in 
the normal regime about 74 percent of the time and in the distressed 
regime the remaining 26 percent of the time.14
A scatter plot of financial stress and economic activity in the two 
regimes suggests three negative relationships (Chart 5). In the chart, 
the blue squares show values of financial stress and economic activity 
in the distressed regime, and the grey diamonds show these values in 
the normal regime. The blue squares show the first negative relation-
ship: Financial stress and economic activity are negatively related in the 
distressed regime (simple correlation of -0.8). The grey diamonds show 
the second negative relationship: Financial stress and economic activity 
are negatively related in the normal regime, though to a much lesser   
degree (simple correlation of -0.3). Finally, the two large circles show 
the third negative relationship: Financial stress and economic activity 
tend to move in opposite directions when the economy switches from 
one regime to the other. The circles indicate the average values of finan-
cial stress and economic activity in each regime. The circle for the dis-
tressed regime lies above and to the left of the circle for the normal re-
gime, implying that average economic activity is lower in the distressed 
regime and average financial stress is higher in the distressed regime.
In addition to differences in the average values of financial stress 
and economic activity, the volatility is higher in the distressed regime 
than in the normal regime. In the distressed regime, the standard devia-
tion of economic activity is over two times larger, and the standard de-
viation of financial stress is nearly three times larger, than in the normal 
regime. This difference in volatility is consistent with the scatter plot 
shown in Chart 5. The grey diamonds in Chart 5 are tightly packed, 
while the blue squares are spread apart. In some respects, though, these 
results understate the rise in uncertainty because the KCFSI already 
incorporates at least two measures of volatility. 15 Therefore, not only 
does higher volatility lead to higher financial stress in the KCFSI, but 
when the economy is in the distressed regime, the volatility of financial 
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III.	 THE	IMPACT	OF	FINANCIAL	STRESS	ON		
ECONOMIC	ACTIVITY:	DYNAMIC	INTERACTIONS
Not only is the average level of financial stress and economic activ-
ity across regimes negatively correlated, but the negative impact of a fi-
nancial shock is larger and longer-lasting in the distressed regime. This 
section explores the dynamic interaction between financial stress and 
economic activity within each regime, as well as the role of financial 
stress in tipping the economy from one regime into another.
The  dynamic  impact  of  financial  stress  on  economic  activity  in   
different regimes
To assess the extent of the differences across regimes, impulse-
response functions are estimated to measure the impact of additional 
financial stress (the impulse) on economic activity (the response).16
 The additional financial stress is taken to be exogenous, so is similar 
Chart 5
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to the financial shock in the financial accelerator model (Chart 2).17 To 
produce the impulse responses, a change in financial stress is allowed 
to affect real activity with a one-month delay, but changes in economic 
activity are assumed to affect financial markets immediately. These as-
sumptions capture the rapidity with which financial markets can adjust 
to incoming data, whereas real capital investment and hiring decisions 
respond more sluggishly to changing conditions. 
 To gain insight into the role of financial stress, the effects of a financial 
stress shock on economic activity and on financial stress in each regime are 
shown in Chart 6.18  The top half of the chart shows the response (with 
95 percent confidence bands) of economic activity to a financial stress 
shock, measured in terms of standard deviations from the average level of 
economic activity in each regime. For comparability across regimes, the 
size of the financial shock in both regimes is the same. The first result, not 
surprisingly, is that a shock causing financial stress leads to a statistically 
significant decline in economic activity that lasts for several months, in 
both the normal regime and distressed regime. In addition, the differences 
in responses are statistically different across regimes.19 The second result is 
also consistent with the Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrest model, namely 
that the effect is larger and longer-lasting in the distressed regime. Spe-
cifically, the impact of an increase in financial stress on economic activity 
is about 50 percent larger when the economy is distressed. In addition, 
the negative effect of higher stress on economic activity lasts longer. For 
example, after two years, the impact of the shock has nearly dissipated in 
the normal regime, whereas in the distressed regime the effects are still 
lingering (Chart 6). 
The bottom half of Chart 6 shows the response of financial stress to 
a financial stress shock, also measured in terms of standard deviations 
from the average level of economic activity in each regime. The effect of 
a financial stress shock on future values of financial stress is more persis-
tent and lasts longer in the distressed regime because the KCFSI returns 
to its average level more slowly in the distressed regime. The slower rate 
of decay in this regime is what persistently holds down economic activ-
ity and might suggest that financial markets could be slower to heal and 
repair themselves in an elevated state of stress.
In many respects, however, the responses of activity in Chart 6 un-
derstate the differences between the two regimes. The average size of a ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2010  49
financial stress shock in the distressed regime is more than four times 
that in the normal regime. Chart 6 shows the response to a shock to 
the KCFSI in each regime, assuming the shock was the same size in 
both the normal and distressed regimes. Chart 7, however, allows the 
size of the shocks to differ in a way that reflects the greater volatility in 
the distressed regime. Not surprisingly, the effect of a one standard-de-
viation financial stress shock—which is larger in the distressed regime 
than in the normal regime—is even larger and lasts longer than in the 
distressed regime.
The effect of financial stress on the probability of moving to the distressed regime
While financial stress may affect economic activity within a regime, 
financial stress and economic activity may also affect the probability 
of moving between regimes. This effect is measured by extending the 
previous model to allow the probability of switching between regimes 
to depend on the level of financial stress and economic activity. 
Chart 6
IMPACT OF A SHOCK TO FINANCIAL STRESS

































































0 5 10 15 20 25
months






























































0 5 10 15 20 25
months






















050  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
The  key  empirical  result  from  estimating  the  regime-switching 
model with this modification is that rising financial stress does indeed 
play an important role in tipping the economy into the distressed re-
gime. From both statistical and economic standpoints, the effects are 
significant. The probability of switching regimes can be written as fol-
lows:20
q = f(α0 + α1KCFSIt-1 + α2CFNAIt-1 )
p = g(β0 + β1KCFSIt-1 + β2CFNAIt-1 ),
where f(.) and g(.) are increasing functions. The only coefficient that is 
statistically significant is α1, which is estimated to be a positive number. 
The other coefficients are statistically indistinguishable from zero. So 
as the KCFSI rises, the probability of the economy tipping from the 
normal regime into the distressed regime, q, increases. 
More specifically, Chart 8 shows how the probability of the econ-
omy moving into the distressed regime, given that it is currently in 
the normal regime, depends on the value of financial stress. For ex-
ample, when the KCFSI is below -1, the probability of moving to the   
Chart 7
IMPACT OF A REGIME-SPECIFIC ONE-STANDARD  
DEVIATION SHOCK TO FINANCIAL STRESS
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distressed regime is near zero, and, equivalently, the probability of re-
maining in the normal regime is near one. However, as financial stress 
rises, the probability that the economy moves into the distressed regime 
also begins rising. In particular, if the KCFSI breaches 0.78, the probabil-
ity of moving into the distressed regime becomes greater than 50 percent. 
In addition, the increase in probability is dramatic. For example, 
when the KCFSI is 0.38, the probability of switching to the distressed 
regime is 0.25. However, if the KCFSI makes a modest increase from 
0.38 to 0.78, the probability of moving to the distressed regime increas-
es to 50 percent. A further increase in the KCFSI from 0.78 to 1.19 
increases the probability of moving to the distressed regime to 0.75. 
This result provides evidence on how financial stress can have a 
particularly severe effect on economic activity. Suppose the economy is 
currently in the normal regime—sometime before the financial market 
disruptions that began in August 2007. While in the normal regime, 
financial stress is low, economic activity is high, and volatility is low. In 
addition, while financial stress shocks lead to declines in economic ac-
tivity, the declines are relatively modest. However, if the economy is hit 
by a series of financial stress shocks, or by one large shock, the probabil-
ity of moving from the normal regime to the distressed regime begins to 
Chart 8
PROBABILIY OF MOVING FROM THE NORMAL REGIME 
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increase. If the shocks are cumulatively large enough, the economy may 
be tipped into the distressed regime. The effect is then dramatic. The 
average level of financial stress is higher, the average level of economic 
activity is lower, and the volatility of both is higher. 
Interestingly,  the  results  indicate  that  when  the  economy  is 
in  the  distressed  regime,  financial  conditions  do  not  play  a  sig-
nificant  role  in  raising  the  probability  that  the  economy  returns 
to  the  normal  regime.  Similarly,  the  results  indicate  changes  in 
the level of economic activity do not play a significant role in mov-
ing  the  economy  between  the  normal  and  distressed  regimes.21
 For example, analogous to Chart 8, the activity index on the horizontal 
axis would simply be a straight, horizontal line. 
These results suggest that a rise in financial stress poses a risk the 
economy may enter a distressed regime. Consequently, policymakers 
should monitor financial conditions closely even when the economy 
appears to be functioning normally. 
IV.		 CONCLUSIONS
The recent financial and economic crisis illustrated the sharp rela-
tionship between financial stress and economic activity. However, such 
a tight connection is not always so obvious, since the economy also 
passes through several years where financial conditions appear to play 
a tangential role in driving economic activity. To assess how the effects 
of financial conditions vary over time, this article considers whether the 
influence of financial stress on economic activity depends on broader 
economic and financial conditions. 
The article finds that the U.S. economy fluctuates between a nor-
mal regime, in which financial stress is low and economic activity is 
high, and a distressed regime, in which financial stress is high and eco-
nomic activity is low. In the distressed regime, the effect of financial 
stress on economic activity can be quite large compared to the normal 
regime. Thus, when financial stress becomes elevated, policymakers 
should pursue policies to alleviate it, since the economy appears to be 
particularly susceptible to further increases in financial stress. 
During less stressful times, policymakers also need to monitor fi-
nancial stress closely, but for a slightly different reason. An event that 
triggers higher financial stress, even if the overall level is generally low, ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2010  53
will raise the probability the economy will enter a distressed state. Thus, 
even when financial conditions are normal, policymakers should closely 
monitor financial conditions. 54  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
APPENDIX	A	
The  financial accelerator model is from Bernanke, Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1999), modified along the lines of Nolan and Thoenissen 
(2009) to incorporate a shock to the net worth of  firms. The complete 
log-linearized model is as follows, where capital letters denote steady 
state values and lower case letters denote log deviations.
Equation (1) is the aggregate resource constraint, indicating that 
log deviations in output(   ) reflect deviations in consumption of non-
entrepreneurs (  ), consumption of entrepreneurs (  ) and investment 
(it ). Equation (2) is the consumption Euler equation, which indicates 
consumption of non-entrepreneurs depends on the current real inter-
est rate (rt ) and expected future consumption. Equation (3) indicates 
that changes in the consumption of entrepreneurs reflects changes in 
their net worth (nt). Equation (4) describes the external finance premium 
(i.e.                    ), which depends on the firm’s net worth relative to the 
value of its capital available for production in the following period, 
qt+kt+1.  Deviations in the price of capital are given by qt and devia-
tions in the amount of capital available for production in the following 
period are given by kt+1. Equation (5) describes the return to capital 
(      ) in terms of next period’s marginal product of capital and ex-
pected capital gains. Equation (6) describes investment (it) in terms of 
the price of capital and current capital stock. Equation (7) describes ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2010  55
how aggregate production     depends on capital and hours worked         
       . Equation (8) describes equilibrium in the labor market and equa-
tion (9) is the forward-looking Phillips curve relation, where current 
inflation (πt ) varies with expected inflation and the markup of retails 
goods over wholesale goods (xt): This markup varies inversely with ag-
gregate demand, so an increase in aggregate demand creates price pres-
sures that feed through to higher inflation. Equation (10) is the law 
of motion for capital, and equation (11) is the law of motion for net 
wealth, where the net wealth shock is given by vt. Equation (12) is the 
monetary policy rule, and equation (13) is the Fisher equation.
Using a quarterly frequency and following Bernanke, Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1999), the following parametric values are used to compute 
the impulse response in Charts 1 and 2 : α= .35 (capital share); β = .99 
(household discount factor); δ = .025 (capital depreciation rate); Ω = 
.64 (household labor share), and γ = .9728 (survival rate of entrepre-
neurs). The elasticity of the external  finance premium with respect to 
the firms net worth, υ, is calculated from a model of the loan contract-
ing problem as described in Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999). 
In this model, the verification cost incurred by banks in the event of 
default is assumed to be a fraction μ= .12 of the firms remaining assets. 
Also, two alternative assumptions are made about the variance of the 
idiosyncratic shocks that hit firms. In the baseline case, the variance of 
the idiosyncratic shocks is .28, the same as in Bernanke, Gertler and 
Gilchrist (1999), and implies υ = .09 and R k/R = 1.014. Under the 
alternative parameterization, which is intended to capture a state of 
heightened uncertainty, the variance is 1.5 and implies υ = .21 and 
R k/R  = 1.0183. The serial correlation in the net wealth shock, ρ, is 
set to .9. The remaining parameters in the above model are as follows: 
C/Y = .65 (steady-state consumption-to-output ratio), I/Y = .14 (steady-
state investment-to-output ratio), C e/C = .01 (steady-state entrepre-
neurial consumption-to-output ratio), η= 3 (labor supply elasticity),     
    = .25 (elasticity of the price of capital with respect to the investment-
capital ratio), κ = .09 (slope of the forward-looking Phillips curve), 
and   = 1.5 (reaction of the nominal interest rate to inflation). Other 
parameters that vary across the two parameterizations are as follows:   = 
.9515 and K/N = 1.52 under the parameterization with low idiosyn-
cratic productivity shocks and   = .9479 and K/N = 1.11 under the 56  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
parameterization with high idiosyncratic productivity shocks. These 
variables vary because they are a function of the steady-state capital 
stock, which depends on the steady-state external finance premium.ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2010  57
APPENDIX	B
The regime-switching vector autoregression specification is as follows
where                                     denote structural innovations that are 
normally distributed with a mean of zero and variance of unity: xt 
denotes the Chicago Fed National Activity Index, and f st denotes the 
Kansas City Fed Financial Stress Index. Also,
In the benchmark version of the model, the transition probabilities are 
constant, so     evolves according to
In the version of the model that allows time-varying probabilities, the 
transition probabilities are parameterized as follows
To estimate the model, the likelihood function is constructed using the 
methods in Kim and Nelson (1999) then numerically maximized.
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ENDNOTES
1For example, see Bernanke (1983), Dixit and Pindyck (1994), and Bloom (2009).
2This argument is an example of what Bernanke (1983, page 91) called the 
“bad news principle of irreversible investments.”  When deciding whether or not 
to wait before investing, the only thing that matters is bad news. When the firm 
chooses to not invest today, it foregoes earning returns today. In exchange for 
this sacrifice, the firm has the “option” to invest next period if the opportunity 
is profitable. As a result, today’s option will be worthless next period if the good 
outcome occurs but is valuable if the bad outcome occurs. As a result, if additional 
bad news is more likely in the future, the incentive to not invest today and wait 
until next year is greater.
3Some references lending support to this claim include Leahy and Whited 
(1996), Guiso and Parigi (1999) and Bloom (2009).
4In this setting, there is asymmetric information, which means that borrow-
ers have greater knowledge regarding the returns to their projects than banks. 
To structure a contract that minimizes the costs associated with this asymmetric 
information, banks issue debt to firms that borrow funds. If the firm fails to re-
pay the full loan amount plus interest, then the bank pays a bankruptcy cost and 
claims whatever assets the firm has available. 
5Bernanke (2007) discusses the adverse feedback loop in the context of the 
recent financial crisis.
6In the context of the Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) model, height-
ened uncertainty refers to an increase in the variance of the idiosyncratic produc-
tivity shock impinging on firms.
7For example, Christiano, Motto and Rostagno (2007) interpret this shock as 
capturing movements in the net wealth of firms that does not reflect movements 
in economic fundamentals. This shock can also be interpreted as an exogenous 
shock to the external finance premium. See also Leahy and Gilchrist (2002) or 
Nolan and Thoenissen (2009) for further analysis of the net wealth shock in a 
financial accelerator framework.
8See Hall and Wetherilt (2002) for details concerning how varying degrees of uncer-
tainty affect the sensitivity of the external finance premium to balance sheet conditions.
9Under this scenario, the standard deviation of the idiosyncratic productivity 
shock mentioned in footnote 6 is slightly more than twice as large than under the 
baseline case.
10The index is calculated using principal component analysis, which esti-
mates the coefficients on the 11 variables so that the index explains the maximum 
possible amount of total variation in the variables from February 1990 through 
the current month. 
11Hakkio and Keeton (2009) review in detail the various events associated 
with movements in the KCFSI.ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2010  59
12Various types of regime-switching models have been used to study the 
interaction between financial conditions, output and monetary policy, such as 
Balke (2000), Atanasova (2003),  Lo and Piger (2005), and Calza and Sousa 
(2006). Of course, there exists a large literature that broadly addresses the im-
pact of financial conditions on economic activity – as just a few recent examples, 
see Guichard and Turner (2008), Gilchrist, Yankov and Zakrajsek (2009),  and 
Hatzius et al (2010).
13The coincident timing in changes to financial stress and economic activity, 
discussed earlier, motivates the use of two regimes in the regime-switching model. 
The unusual nature of the recent crisis and recession suggests that this episode 
could be categorized as a separate regime, suggesting a three-regime switching 
model. However, estimation indicates that the early episodes share characteristics 
with the recent crisis. If this were not the case, then the two-regime switching 
model would identify the recent crisis as a separate regime, given its extreme 
nature, and categorize all other points in the sample as a single regime. The speci-
fication of two regimes is suggested by simply inspecting the data. An alternative 
specification could allow two regimes for financial stress and two for economic 
activity. But specifying four regimes, corresponding to the four possible combina-
tions, would be unnecessarily complicated. Specifying two regimes is more parsi-
monious and captures the basic properties of the data-primarily that the episodic 
shifts in financial stress and economic activity roughly coincide. 
14The economy is considered to be in the normal regime if the probability of 
being there is greater than 0.5.
15KCFSI includes the implied volatility of overall stock prices (as measured 
by the VIX) and it includes a variable that measures the idiosyncratic volatility of 
bank stock prices.
16Hakkio and Keeton (2009) also estimate a VAR for KCFSI and CFNAI 
and plot impulse response functions. The model in this paper assumes two re-
gimes, while the Hakkio and Keeton results assume there is a single regime. Even 
so, their results are consistent with those reported here in the sense that their 
results can be roughly interpreted as an average response across the two regimes.  
17The shock in the regime-switching model, however, is not exactly the same 
shock in the financial accelerator model, since the shock to the KCFSI is a com-
posite of several different financial variables. 
18That is, the impulse responses in Chart 6 assume that the economy remains 
in either the normal or distressed regime every period, even though the potential 
exists for the economy to shift between the different regimes.
19To assess whether the differences in the responses are statistically signifi-
cant, a 90 percent confidence band for the mean difference in responses was 
calculated using Monte Carlo simulations drawing from the variance-covariance 
matrix of parameter estimates. The upper band of this confidence band is below 
zero for roughly 2 years.60  FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
20These relationships are only for building intuition regarding how the prob-
abilities vary with financial and economic conditions. The exact relationships are 
given in Appendix B.
21This result is reminiscent of the finding in Hakkio and Keeton (2009) that 
the CFNAI does not help predict the KCFSI.ECONOMIC REVIEW • SECOND QUARTER 2010  61
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